"O! when degree is shak'd, Which is the ladder to all high designs, The enterprise is sick. " -Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida
The famous, or infamous, pioneers of the first wave of European colonialism never tired of asserting that the project of colonial domination was a difficult and precarious one, requiring the "strongest power on water and land," in the words of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, an early Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies (Coen [1620] 1919:554). Subjugating indigenous populations and overcoming metropolitan and colonial competitors were central challenges, of course, although they could be taken too far, even from the colonialists' perspective. For, as Coen's metropolitan critics reminded him, "there is no profit at all in an empty sea, empty countries, and dead people" (quoted in Meilink-Roelofz 1962:232). Within these not unimportant limits, however, colonialists also faced dilemmas inherent in their own organizational structures; it is this complex of issues that is highlighted here. I argue that network structures mediated principal/agent relationships among early modern European colonialists. The capacity of principals in Europe to control their agents in the colonies depended on specific structural relationships-simultaneously political and economic-that bound them together. In the Dutch case, the principals first disposed of resources that the agents required, and agents lacked viable alternatives to the network channels that linked them to the Netherlands. But a seismic shift in that opportunity structure opened the way for heightened principal/agent problems and undermined group discipline, contributing to the demise of Dutch hegemony and the rise of the English empire in the eighteenth century. This was clearly an outcome of global historical Once launched, the VOC soon became an organizational template for other metropolitan merchants and rulers, inspiring, among others, the English East India Company and the many French Compagnies des Indes Orientales. It remained one of the most successful of the many hybrid colonial enterprises whose licensed mercantile ambitions and fields of operation spanned the globe, ranging from the spice and cloth trades of Indonesia and India, to the Brazilian sugar industry and the African slave trade. Thus the Dutch case is indispensable for sociologists-a key to our understanding the formation of the global colonial system in the seventeenth century and clarifying the causal factors that made for organizational success in that system.
We can also investigate factors that led to failure and systemic transformation. By the end of the eighteenth century, the close of the Dutch ancien regime, the patrimonial structure was severely strained. It soon gave way altogether. In the metropole, the European center of the global colonial system, it was replaced by differentiated profit-making enterprises, twinned with a power-wielding state. In the colonies, the developmental story is not so neat. link up with external constraints and opportunity structures, especially the appearance of alternative (non-Dutch) channels of patrimonial authority?
That these questions remain genuine puzzles is partly due to gaps in the available historiography. The period of decay and reconstruction of colonial power, particularly the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, is one of the least researched eras in the history of the "Greater Netherlands," perhaps because it pales in comparison to the glittering Golden Age. Yet it spans the crucial transformation from a fundamentally commercial empire, flowering under the patrimonial protection of the Dutch East Indies Company, to the less extensive but vastly more penetrative combination of colonial state and system of forced cultivations and extractions that replaced Company rule in Indonesia.3
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS IN PATRIMONIAL SYSTEMS
The organization of early modern European colonialism in general, and Dutch colonialism in particular, was an ambitious effort to accumulate capital and project power abroad. As such, it involved several levels of agency relationships, ties that may be said to exist "when a principal delegates some rights ... to an agent who is bound by a (formal or informal) contract to represent the principal's interests" (Eggertsson 1990 :40-41). Expansion by means of extending and multiplying agency relationships was a two-edged sword. While it promised gains in the principal's efficacy and reach, it also created problems of monitoring agents' activities and enforcing compliance through sanctions. Following Simon ([1947] 1961) and Williamson (1975) , I begin by assuming that both principals and agents tend to act in intendedly rational fashion, and opportunistically, to advance their own individual gains (exogenously specified). If social actors see an attractive opportunity, they will pursue it, even if they must contemplate guile. "Promises to behave responsibly that are unsupported by credible commitments will not, therefore, be reliably discharged" (Williamson 1991:92). Whence the principal's problems with its agents, and the need for incentives and sanctions. I am provisionally working, then, from within that branch of utilitarian theory that views information gaps and enforcement problems as consequential to the analysis. Later in this paper, I will problematize these essentially rational-actor assumptions. But for the moment, the discussion assumes that they hold.4
Certain organizational arrangements can help minimize the problem. Principals will be drawn to any arrangement that makes agents easier to check up on, that brings agents' aims more closely into line with theirs, that increases agents' dependence on them, that decreases collusion among agents, and that enables the principal to mete out rewards and punishments to maximum effect. On one end of the spectrum of organizational options lie command structures, or hierarchies, which tend to lend continuity and stability to ongoing enterprises; on the other, ideal-typical contracts, which promise greater flexibility. The two types are best seen as poles bracketing a continuum that includes many forms of contractual hierarchies or hierarchical contracts.5 Furthermore, these 3 I use the term "Indonesia" anachronistically, since no single nation-state existed during the period under examination. Nor did "India" or "the Indies" have exact geographical referents; from the western European vantage point, these words referred vaguely to the lands east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Azores. The EIC stayed afloat and navigated the Scylla and Charybdis of ruler and estates (unlike some of the French companies, for example), but only with difficulty. Episodic contention between the Crown and Parliament, the two putative heads of international commercial/colonial policy, continued to undercut the Company's ability to enforce its monopoly and to hold together its own merchant sponsors. The EIC's prospects improved under Cromwell, whose 1657 charter, modeled on the VOC's, endowed the EIC with its first permanent joint stock organization. This arrangement was reaffirmed by Charles II after the Restoration. But the backwash of the metropolitan struggle between monarch and estates continued even beyond the Glorious Revolution of 1688.7 Two-or multi-headed organizations can perform well under certain circumstances. Business partners in a competitive capitalist firm share residual claims on the firm's profits and are thus constrained to cooperate because of their shared bottom-line goal. They may also be disciplined by the economic environment: All else being equal, a capitalist firm will presumably go bankrupt if it fails to perform efficiently, since it is competing with other firms.8 But patrimonial principals in early modern Europe enjoyed much more social latitude for nonoptimizing behavior. Even when engaged in joint enterprises, they were wont to aim at goals that were contingently compatible at best (the monarch seeking territorial aggrandizement and members of the estates pursuing mercantile profit, to put one common situation crudely). Call it the "Hydra Factor": The multiple heads or principals lacked institutional mechanisms to resolve the resulting uncertainties and infighting.
This factor influenced the comparatively gradual consolidation of the EIC. Although the English and Dutch companies were launched within two years of one another, the English company was much slower to develop an organizational identity and permanent capital. The leisurely rhythm of company development was also imposed by the EIC's inability to best the Dutch in the Spice Islands. So far I have focused on the metropolitan pole of colonial rule, concentrating on the period in which its patrimonial organization was launched. As the colonial system got underway and state-sponsored corporate bodies like the chartered companies took off, the relationship among metropolitan principals became more -adversarial. The VOC in particular could act as a state within a state-so various Dutch regents complained, or exulted, depending on whether they controlled one of the coveted directorships. But the Seventeen Gentlemen were also the principals of the Dutch East Indies Company, and in that role they confronted the intractable independence of their own colonial agents. Governor-General van Riebeek, head of the VOC's East Indies operation, put this in a nutshell when he chided his metropolitan superiors in a 1714 letter: "The Gentlemen in the Fatherland decide things as they see fit, but we do things here, as we best understand and decide them" (quoted in Gaastra 1991:68).
THE DUTCH EAST INDIES COLONIAL HIERARCHY
At the outset of the colonial project, the nuts and bolts of the Dutch East Indies system worked as follows. The Seventeen Gentlemen would send two to three Company fleets a year to their main outpost in IndonesiaBatavia (present-day Jakarta in Java). These fleets carried goods and precious metals for trading, men to replenish the colonial servants (who were continually dying off), and instructions to the colonial government. Each trip took between seven and nine months each way, sailing via the Cape of Good Hope to Batavia and back. Once unloaded in Indonesia, the materials, men, and instructions fell under the jurisdiction of Batavia's top colonial agents: the members of the Indies Council and its chairman, the Governor-General, together known as the High Indies Government (Hoge Regering). These agents, or company servants, as they were called, would then dispense the cargos to the lower rungs of the colonial hierarchy.10 These lower levels included the VOC's roving merchants and its settlements and "factories" archy to occupy major decision-making positions, notwithstanding popular Horatio Alger-style tales of humble cabin boys ascending through VOC ranks to the post of Governor-General. 12 From Indonesia, VOC merchants and their assistants transported some of the incoming specie and goods to India, Japan, Persia, and eventually China. Since there was little demand for European commodities at this early stage of imperialism, precious metals, both in bar form and in specie (coin), played an important role in this trade. In China, for example, the VOC sold silver imported from Europe and invested the profits in Chinese silk. The silk was then shipped to Japan and traded for gold and copper. The gold and copper were exchanged for textiles in India. Buying cheap and selling dear was a fundamental source of VOC profits, not simply at the endpoint of the European staple market, but at every stage along the way.
The VOC had fully 30 factories in the East Indies by the end of the seventeenth century. These were not factories in the modern sense, of course; they were points of collection for goods from specific local trades and organizing nodes for exercizing control over prevailing production relations. On Ceylon and the Moluccan islands, VOC factors organized extraction within coerced tributary relations. There spices were the commodity in question; cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, and mace composed the heart of the monopoly. The VOC later applied this schema to coffee-growing, which it engrossed in Batavia's hinterlands, after they were "pacified" in the 1680s. In other factories, the Company did not function in this feudal-lordly fashion, but instead ordered goods on consignment from indigenous merchant/brokers, to be delivered at piece rates. This was the case in the factories in India, where the VOC bought local textiles. Finally, some goods, like Chinese tea, were delivered by means of inter-merchant contacts in Batavia.
Once appropriated, the Indies goods would pass through Batavia, to be shipped back to the Netherlands on one of the large, armed, return fleets. On arrival, the return cargoes would be held in VOC warehouses until the time came for the Company's periodic and highly profitable auctions, releasing the goods to the European market. Some of the monies realized would then be allotted for organizational running costs, some for shareholder dividends and directors' cuts, while the rest was ploughed back into expanding the Company capital. The whole trade cycle, from the original investment decisions to the final realization of profits, stretched over two years-more if one takes into account the ultimate source of the specie, which was not in the Netherlands, but derived from the Americas and Japan.13
The trade cycle was also fraught with uncertainty. The genius of the VOC lay in the novel steps it took to reduce risk. On the one hand, the unprecedented scale of its capital base and operations enabled it to manage supply and demand, and to cut out traditional middle markets that had raised a whole series of intermediary risks (Musgrave 1981 14 In this it differed markedly from the EIC, whose early aspirations to interport Asian monopoly were thwarted by inadequate capitalization and by infighting among metropolitan principals that strengthened metropolitan interlopers. The EIC permitted its own servants to trade in Asia, a practice that was initially a symptom and source of organizational weakness. Furber (1976, chap. 6) compares the "country trade" patterns for the Dutch and English empires.
As we would expect of a multivocal patrimonial structure, the Dutch East Indies Company's capacity to muster massive force was key to its success. The VOC undertook some extraordinary coercive interventions, like Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen's selective extermination of the Bandanese Islanders, and the military attacks that ousted the English East India Company from the Archipelago; but the Company also depended on dull daily compulsion to carry on business as usual. At every stage, military pressure helped the VOC maintain the interlocking institutional arrangements for extracting and realizing surplus. Force was applied at the point of production (most importantly in the spice monopoly process) and at the point of exchange, in dealings with indigenous merchants and brokers. As the VOC's holdings expanded, so did its need for effective coercion. And in all cases, the credible threat of force guaranteed the general rules of the game, from the bogus treaties mandating relations of vassalage with local potentates to the rule of law that secured the VOC's monopoly in the Netherlands. Relations of force and fraud were not external to, but were constitutive of, the Dutch patrimonial colonial chain. 15 The VOC managed to militarily enforce its world monopoly on cloves, near monopoly on nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon, and to control the pepper trade against a formidable array of contenders, both European and Asian, in Dutch-Indonesian trade and intra-Indonesian commerce. By the mid-seventeenth century, the VOC had consolidated its hold and was trading widely, not only in spices, but also in Chinese, Persian, and Indian silks, Japanese copper, Indian sugar, and other commodities.
The VOC extended its organizational capacity by substituting Company hierarchies for middle markets and negotiating hierarchical contracts with Asian agents. This is consistent with Thompson's (1967) claim that economic uncertainty may engender vertical integration, and with Stinchcombe's (1990) argument that environmental uncertainty is the driving force influencing the direction of growth of formal structures. Yet the very expansion of organization and the internalization of middle markets and armed force into its hierarchy that made the VOC a vaunted model for other European colonialists also generated new uncertainties, especially new problems of internal discipline. The Seventeen Gentlemen expected their colonial agents to do as they were told. But given the multi-step organizational character of the VOC and the length of time it took information and orders from the metropole to arrive in the Indies, thorny problems of communication and control were bound to arise. Thus for all its problems with multiple metropolitan principals jostling for supremacy, the EIC had fewer difficulties dictating specific courses of action to its top colonial servants than did the VOC. Recall, however, that the EIC was also a feebler organization than the VOC in the early seventeenth century, because of the two-headed structure of English patrimonialism prior to the Glorious Revolution. So the EIC did not-yet-offer Dutch Indies servants serious competition or a possible alternative employer. 16 The EIC did use such information to negatively sanction agents. Most spectacular, perhaps, was the 1732 decision to dismiss the entire commercial council of Calcutta. For this and related events, see Chaudhuri (1978:76; Even more important for VOC servants' prospects of gain was what historians have designated the "private trade." The term "private" is a misnomer, however: This trade actually revolved around VOC employees who had access to Company monopoly goods because of their privileged intermediary position, and who traded in these goods on the side. This semiprivate contraband trade unfolded at the direct expense of Company commerce, since servants skimmed off monopoly and monopsony products and were loath to enforce Company political dictates when such restrictions interfered with the sideline trade. Private trade also took place at all points in the colonial network, although it was specially concentrated in some spots, such as the Bengal-Batavia link (Prakash 1985) . How did the Seventeen Gentlemen keep the problem in bounds? Surprisingly, to a "modern" eye (or at least to a rational-legal bureaucratic one), they did not do so by means of sharply graded monetary incentives keyed to effort or output. The Gentlemen paid their servants an ungentlemanly pittance, even at the highest levels, and counted on their making money on the side. Nor did the Company insist that its servants post forfeitable bonds, which might have provided a potential negative sanction on malfeasance.18
CENTRALITY, DEPENDENCY, AND CARTEL DISCIPLINE
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Instead, I argue, the network of brokerage relations enabled the VOC principals to maintain some measure of cartel discipline. This structural feature was a crucial element in the Seventeen's measure of disciplinary success in the early years of colonialism. At this early stage, stylized in Figure 1 , the elite at all colonial nodes still depended on the Dutch home base for key economic brokerage services, as well as for the political protection they needed to conduct their semiprivate trade. There was no plausible "alternative employer" or outlet for the fruits of the VOC servants' clandestine commerce. Some profits or goods, such as precious stones and jewels, could be smuggled back home on VOC ships, but sending anything beyond a limited amount was risky, and required adroit collusion with ships' crews and a whole chain of metropolitan officials, arranged from a long way away.'9 The employees in Asia who wanted to transfer larger amounts of funds to the Netherlands could do so legally, by depositing their money in the VOC's Batavian treasury or in the treasuries of Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope (and other VOC offices after the mid-eighteenth century). In return, employees could draw bills of exchange, which were then shipped The agents' dependence on these mechanisms for transferring their profits enabled the principals, the VOC directors, to enforce conventional limits to profiteering. Besides policing their home harbors, the Seventeen Gentlemen also sought to hold down the overall amount of transfers. In 1636, they decided that Batavia would only be allowed to accept a fixed amount of money for bills of exchange, an amount far below what VOC servants demanded. Although that edict and subsequent proclamations were often evaded and the directors increasingly acknowledged that "a strict observance of these rules would stimulate their servants to seek other waysfor instance via the English company-to transfer their money" (Gaastra 1994 For now, my argument treats the ascent of the EIC and its corollary, the rise of sideline traders, as an exogenous variable. As such, it posed a direct threat to the VOC by cutting into its profits and undermining its capacity to obtain the necessary quota of trade goods to support its position in Europe.23 It also presented a more subtle, but equally damaging threat, by providing new and appetizing opportunities that sabotaged the control that the Seventeen Gentlemen had over their Asian agents. The rise of the EIC and of English private traders offered new opportunities for Dutch agents to make a guilder on the side. Private trade was easier to carry on, particularly for the top servants at peripheral outposts close to English turf. These practices extended all the way up the hierarchy to the Governor-General. For example, Governor-General Jacob Mossel was heavily tied up with British country traders (Furber 1976: 281) . Conveying the profits back home was also simplified. VOC servants could now convert their gains into cash and bank them in the metropole by shipping them through either the English hierarchy, the VOC, or both.24 And although pursuing the English route involved additional steps and risks of apprehension, these inconveniences were counterbalanced by the greater amounts of clandestine goods that could be converted.
These new opportunities affected the formal hierarchy in a twofold way. On the one hand, the Batavian elite used its privileged brokerage position to tighten its grip on what was becoming the central position in the Dutch colonial network by the late seventeenth century. The Seventeen now held an intermediate slot, structurally similar to the EIC's Court of Directors. On the other hand, VOC officials situated at peripheral colonial nodes found that they could dodge the more 23 By the end of the 1690s, the English dominated the Indian piece-goods market so thoroughly that "the Dutch had to travel to London and purchase samples to send back to India for reproduction" (Furber 1976:249 We have seen that betweenness made a difference in a node's capacity, in this case Batavia's, to control resource inflows. When it comes to brokering outflows, the flip side of how network position contributes to increased power, what matters more than betweenness is closeness-the number of nodes that a unit must traverse to reach other nodes (Marsden 1982; Freeman 1979) . To be close to most other actors in a system is to have relatively little need for any particular node's brokerage services. This dimension of centrality is correlated with autonomy, or independence: relative freedom from the constraints imposed by having to depend on any particular actor. In this sense, the Batavian officials were growing more autonomous from their home base, while the officials under Batavia in the hierarchy were simultaneously breaking away from Batavia's influence. This twofold structural shift heralded a general breakdown of VOC cartel, or group discipline.
To counter the breakdown, the Seventeen Gentlemen had more than one logical option. They could have proffered the carrot, by raising wages. A variant of this strategy would have involved acknowledging agents' rights to private trade and then taking a cut of their agents' new-found fortunes, which was basically the English solution. Or they could have increased situational sanctions-in other words, brandished the stick. A helpful analogy is to the reservation utility, the nextbest package of resources for workers that becomes available when alternative employment opportunities appear. When the reservation utility increases, incentives (such as wages) or monitoring levels must also improve if employee performance is to be sustained.25
The Seventeen Gentlemen were not willing to increase incentives, and they experienced heightened problems applying negative sanctions. The Seventeen certainly had the de jure right to fire agents whose malfeasance reached levels that commanded their
